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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of secret key generation with one-way communication through both a rate-limited
public channel and a rate-limited secure channels where the public channel is from Alice to Bob and Eve and the secure channel is
from Alice to Bob. In this model, we do not pose any constraints on the sources, i.e. Bob is not degraded to or less noisy than Eve.
We obtain the optimal secret key rate in this problem, both for the discrete memoryless sources and vector Gaussian sources. The
vector Gaussian characterization is derived by suitably applying the enhancement argument, and Proving a new extremal inequality.
The extremal inequality can be seen as coupling of two extremal inequalities, which are related to the degraded compound MIMO
Gaussian broadcast channel, and the vector generalization of Costa’s entropy power inequality, accordingly.
Index Terms
Correlated sources, entropy power inequality, extremal inequality, information-theoretic security, secret key generation, vector
Gaussian sources.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secret key generation was introduced by Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2], and by Maurer [3], where two separate
terminals, named Alice and Bob, observe the outcomes of a pair of correlated sources separately and want to generate a common
secret key, which is concealed from an eavesdropper Eve, given that the terminals can communicate through a noiseless public
channel which the eavesdropper has complete access to. In [2], the secret key capacity of correlated sources was characterized
when Alice and Bob are allowed to communicate once over a channel with unlimited capacity. The secrecy key capacity was
found by Csisza´r and Narayan [4] when there is a constraint on the rate of the public channel.
From then on, the secret key generation from correlated sources problem has been attracted considerable attention, both in
limited rate constraints setting [5]–[9], and unlimited rate constraints setting [10]–[15]. However, for many models of interest
in practise, the key capacity problem still remains unsolved. In [16], the secret key generation problem through rate limited
noiseless public channel was extended to source with continuous alphabets. The fundamental limits for vector Gaussian sources,
which are natural models of multiple input multiple output (MIMO) systems, was characterized. In [17], a water filling solution
was further derived for the product vector Gaussian sources.
In this paper, we consider the problem of secret key generation with one-way communication, where in addition to the rate
limited public channel, which can be observed by both Bob and Eve, we add a secure channel, which only connects Alice
and Bob. One of the motivations of this problem comes from wireless sensor network with fading channels, where the nodes
want to share a secret key to encrypt their communication. In this scenario, the frequency selectivity of the fading channels
will create both public and secure channels. More specifically, in some frequency bands, the links from Alice to both Bob and
Eve are of good qualities, which constitute the public channel. In some other frequency bands, the link from Alice to Bob is
of good quality, but the link from Alice to Eve is basically broken. These frequency bands can be viewed as a secure channel.
Another motivating example comes from [18], where Alice and Bob are nodes equipped with multiple antennas and they
want to communicate to share a secret key with the help of multiple single-antenna relays employing the amplify-and-forward
strategy. We assume that some relays are “nice but curious” [19] which can be viewed as Eve, while the other relays are
simply nice. Therefore, the links through the curious relays are public, while the links through the nice relays are secure.
Our problem can be viewed as a special case of the problem of secret key generation from correlated sources with the
broadcast channel introduced in [20], where Alice, Bob and Eve are connected by a one-way broadcast channel and they
observe the outcomes of correlated sources separately which are independent of the channel. This problem in general is very
difficult, because it is hard to identify the optimal strategies to combine the two resources, the channel and the sources, to
generate a secret key between Alice and Bob. Therefore, the secret key capacity in this problem remains unknown in its general
form. Achievability schemes and converses have been proposed in [21], [22]. However, these achievabilities and converses in
general do not match.
For the vector Gaussian sources problem, one of difficulties to show the fundamental tradeoff between the key capacity and
the communication constraints is that vector Gaussian sources are not in general degraded. This difficulty frequently appears in
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2several vector Gaussian multi-terminal problem [23]–[27]. In [16], Watanabe and Oohama circumvent this difficulty by suitably
applying the enhancement argument. Further invoking the so-called Costa’s type extremal inequality [26], they showed that one
Gaussian auxiliary random variable suffices to characterise the rate region. However, for the private and public communication
available in our setting, it will been seen that single auxiliary random variable fails to characterize the tradeoff between the
key capacity and communication rate. As a consequence, applying Costa’s type extremal inequality alone is not sufficient
when the public communication constraint is considered. The desired converse result can be eventually obtained by a suitable
integration of the classical enhancement argument. With the enhanced source model, the corresponding extremal inequality
should be decoupled into two enhanced extremal inequalities, in which one is related to the degraded compound MIMO
Gaussian broadcast channel in [28], [29], and the other one is the vector generalization of Costa’s entropy power inequality in
[16], [26].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The problem setup is given in Section II, we first derive the optimal achievable
rate region for the case of discrete memoryless sources case, and then we show the rate region characterization for the case of
vector Gaussian sources considered in this paper. The achievablility and converse proof for the discrete memoryless sources
are shown in Section III. Section IV is devoted to proof our new extremal inequality, and we show the Gaussian auxiliary
random variables suffice to achieve the optimal rate region, for the vector Gaussian sources. In Section V, we conclude with
a summary of our results and a remark on future research.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MAIN RESULT
A. Discrete Memoryless Sources
Consider a network with three nodes, including a transmitter Alice, a receiver Bob and an eavesdropper Eve. We assume
three discrete memoryless sources indicated by random variables (X,Y, Z), defined in the alphabets (X ,Y,Z), respectively.
We assume that Alice and Bob observe the n-length source sequences Xn and Y n, respectively, and Eve observes n-length
source sequence Zn. In order to generate a secret key K , which is shared by Alice and Bob and concealed from Eve, Alice
can send two messages M1 and M2, where M1 is through a noiseless public channel, which can be observed by Eve, and M2
is through a noiseless secure channel, to which Eve has no access.
A (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code consists of
• a public encoding function φ1 : Xn 7→ Mn1 = [1 : 2
nR1 ] that finds a codeword m1(x
n) to each n-length source sequence
xn, and sends it to both Bob and Eve,
• a private encoding function φ2 : Xn 7→ Mn2 = [1 : 2
nR2 ] that finds a codeword m2(x
n) to each n-length source sequence
xn, and sends it to both Bob only,
• a key generation function ψ1 : Xn 7→ Kn = [1 : 2nRK ] that assigns a random mapping k1(xn) by giving Alice’s n-length
source sequence xn,
• a key generation function ψ2 : Yn ×Mn1 ×M
n
2 7→ K
n = [1 : 2nRK ] that assigns a random mapping k2(y
n,m1,m2) by
giving Bob’s n-length source sequence yn and all received indices m1 and m2.
Then the secret key is generated by Alice and Bob from the functions ψ1 and ψ2, respectively, which should agree with
probability 1 and be concealed from Eve. The probability of error for the key generation code is defined as
P (n)e = Pr{K1 6= K2}. (1)
The key leakage rate at Eve is defined as
R
(n)
L = max
j∈{1,2}
1
n
I(Kj;Z
n,M1). (2)
Definition 1. A secret key rate RK with constraint communication rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable if there exists a sequence
of (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code such that
lim
n→∞
P (n)e = 0, (3)
lim
n→∞
R
(n)
L = 0. (4)
For the discrete memoryless source setting, we have the following single-letter expression on the largest achievable secret
key rate RK with public and private communication constraints R1 and R2.
Theorem 1. For the discrete memoryless source secret key generation problem with public and private communication
constraints, the rate tuple (RK , R1, R2) is achievable if and only if
RK −R2 ≤ I(U ;Y |V )− I(U ;Z|V ), (5)
R1 +R2 ≥ I(U ;X |Y ), (6)
R1 ≥ I(V ;X |Y ), (7)
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Fig. 1. Secret key generation with rate constrained public and private communications
where random variables (V, U,X, Y, Z) satisfy the following Markov chain
V → U → X → (Y, Z). (8)
Proof. See Section III.
B. Vector Gaussian Sources
Now we study the same communication constrained secret key generation problem, for the vector Gaussian sources setting
(see Fig.1). Let {X(t),Y(t),Z(t)}nt=1 be i.i.d. vector-valued discrete time Gaussian sources, where across the time index t,
each tuple is drawn from the same jointly vector Gaussian distribution. The encoder, the legitimate decoder and the eavesdropper
decoder observe X(t), Y(t) and Z(t), respectively. The vector Gaussian source {X(t),Y(t),Z(t)}nt=1 can be written as
Y(t) = X(t) +NY (t), (9)
Z(t) = X(t) +NZ(t), (10)
where each X(t) is a p × 1-dimensional Gaussian random vector with mean zero and covariance K ≻ 0, each NY (t) is
a p × 1-dimensional Gaussian random vector with mean zero and covariance KY ≻ 0, and NZ(t) is a p × 1-dimensional
Gaussian random vector with mean zero and covariance KZ ≻ 0, respectively. We shall point out that (NY (t),NZ(t)) and
X(t) are independent from expressions (9) and (10). However, no additional independence relationship is imposed between
NY (t) and NZ(t).
In [16], the authors showed that a single layer code suffices, and characterize the optimal trade-off on RK and R1 for
the vector Gaussian sources setting. Their converse method is motivated by the enhancement argument [23], [24] for vector
Gaussian wiretap channel in [25]. In this paper, we show a similar enhancement on two-layer superposition codes can be
applied to establish the converse proof on the optimal (RK , R1, R2) trade-off problem.
According to Theorem 1 for discrete memoryless sources , a single-letter description of the optimal (RK , R1, R2) trade-off
for the vector Gaussian secret key generation problem can be given as follows.
Theorem 2. For the vector Gaussian secret key generation problem with public and private communication constraints, the
rate tuple (RK , R1, R2) is achievable if and only if
RK −R2 ≤
1
2
log
|K+KY −B1|
|K+KY −B1 −B2|
−
1
2
log
|K+KZ −B1|
|K+KZ −B1 −B2|
, (11)
R1 +R2 ≥
1
2
log
|K|
|K−B1 −B2|
−
1
2
log
|K+KY |
|K+KY −B1 −B2|
, (12)
R1 ≥
1
2
log
|K|
|K−B1|
−
1
2
log
|K+KY |
|K+KY −B1|
, (13)
for some positive semi-definite matrices B1, B2  0.
Proof. The achievable part of Theorem 2 is based on constructing Gaussian test channels to maintain the Markov chain
V → U → X → (Y,Z), and the details can be found in Appendix A. The converse part of Theorem 2 relies on a careful
combination of the usage of channel enhancement argument and extremal inequalities, and the details can be found in Section
IV.
4Remark 1. It should be pointed out that the jointly vector Gaussian sources given by (9) and (10) are not in the most general
form. In the general case, we have
Y(t) = HYX(t) +NY (t), (14)
Z(t) = HZX(t) +NZ(t), (15)
for some matrices HY ∈ RmY ×p, HZ ∈ RmZ×p. The extension of Theorem 2 can be obtained by following the lines of [16,
Sec. V], in a similar manner.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Principles of the Achievability
The achievability scheme that we propose in this paper can be viewed as a combination of the scheme in secret key generation
from correlated sources [4], consisting of a codebook of the superposition structure, and secret key distribution through secret
channel. Moreover, this scheme can be viewed as a special case of the separated achievable scheme in [22, Th.2].
The rate of the public channel and the secure channel are used for the transmission of the following:
1) the inner code V n.
2) the outer code Un.
3) key distribution.
Our proposed scheme follows the principles below:
• The public channel is used to transmit the inner code V n. Since the rate of the inner code is less than the rate of the
public channel, then the leftover rate of the public channel will be used to transmit the outer code Un.
• The secure channel is used to transmit the outer code Un. Since there is still extra rate leftover in the secure channel,
then the leftover rate of the secure channel can be used for key distribution.
• The public channel can not be used for key distribution and the secure channel can not be used to transmit the inner code
V n.
We show that the proposed scheme achieves the rate in Theorem 1 and is thus, optimal. For the completeness, the details
of the proof can be found in Appendix B.
B. The Converse
We begin the proof of the converse with
nRK ≤ H(K) (16)
(a)
≤ H(K)−H(K|Y n,M1,M2) + nǫ (17)
= I(K;Y n,M1,M2) + nǫ (18)
(b)
≤ I(K;Y n,M1,M2)− I(K;Z
n,M1) + 2nǫ (19)
= I(K;Y n,M1) + I(K;M2|Y
n,M1)− I(K,M2;Z
n,M1)− I(M2;Z
n,M1|K) + 2nǫ (20)
= I(K,M2;Y
n,M1) + I(K;M2|Y
n,M1)− I(M2;Y
n,M1|K)− I(K,M2;Z
n,M1)
− I(M2;Z
n,M1|K) + 2nǫ (21)
= I(K,M2;Y
n,M1) + I(K;M2|Y
n,M1)− I(M2;Y
n,M1,K)− I(K,M2;Z
n,M1)
− I(M2;Z
n,M1,K) + 2nǫ (22)
= I(K,M2;Y
n,M1)− I(M2;Y
n,M1)− I(K,M2;Z
n,M1)− I(M2;Z
n,M1,K) + 2nǫ (23)
= I(K,M2;Y
n|M1)− I(K,M2;Z
n|M1)− I(M2;Y
n,M1)− I(M2;Z
n,M1,K) + 2nǫ (24)
= I(K,M2;Y
n|M1)− I(K,M2;Z
n|M1) +H(M2)− I(M2;Y
n,M1)−H(M2|Z
n,M1,K) + 2nǫ (25)
(c)
≤ I(K,M2;Y
n|M1)− I(K,M2;Z
n|M1) + nR2 + 2nǫ. (26)
where
(a) follows from Fano’s inequality;
(b) follows from the secrecy constraint in (4);
(c) follows by the non-negativity of discrete entropy and mutual information.
By applying the key identity [30, Lemma 17.12], it follows that
I(K,M2;Y
n|M1)− I(K,M2;Z
n|M1) = n[I(U ;YJ |V )− I(U ;ZJ |V )], (27)
5where
V , (M1, Y
i−1, Zni+1, J), (28)
U , (K,M2, T ). (29)
Here, J is uniformly distributed on [1 : n] and independent of (Xn, Y n, Zn). Since K , M1 and M2 is a function of X
n, the
Markov Chain V → U → X → (Y, Z) is satisfied. Because of the fact that (Xn, Y n, Zn) are i.i.d., we can replace YJ and
ZJ by Y and Z . Then (5) is proved.
Next, we consider the sum rate (R1 +R2)
n(R1 +R2) ≥ H(M1,M2) (30)
≥ H(M1,M2|Y
n) (31)
(a)
≥ H(K,M1,M2|Y
n)− nǫ (32)
≥ H(K,M1,M2|Y
n)−H(K,M1,M2|X
n)− nǫ (33)
= I(K,M1,M2;X
n)− I(K,M1,M2;Y
n)− nǫ
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(K,M1,M2;Xi|X
n
i+1, Y
i−1)− I(K,M1,M2;Yi|X
n
i+1, Y
i−1)]− nǫ (34)
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1;Xi)− I(K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1;Yi)]− nǫ (35)
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Xi)− I(K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Yi)]− nǫ (36)
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Xi|Yi)− nǫ (37)
(f)
≥
n∑
i=1
[I(K,M1,M2, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Xi)− I(K,M1,M2, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Yi)]− nǫ, (38)
where
(a) follows from Fano’s inequality;
(b) follows from the key identity [30, Lemma 17.12];
(c) follows because (Xn, Y n, Zn) are i.i.d.;
(d) follows from the Markov Chain Zni+1 → (K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1)→ (Xi, Yi);
(e) follows from the Markov Chain Yi → Xi → (K,M1,M2, Xni+1, Y
i−1, Zni+1);
(f) follows from the Markov Chain Xni+1 → (K,M1,M2, Y
i−1, Zni+1, Xi)→ Yi.
We thereby have
n(R1 + R2) ≥ n[I(U ;XJ)− I(U ;YJ)] (39)
= nI(U ;XJ |YJ ) (40)
= nI(U ;X |Y ). (41)
with U as defined in (29) and J is uniform on [1 : n].
Finally, for the public rate R1, we have
nR1 ≥ H(M1) (42)
≥ H(M1|Y
n) (43)
≥ H(M1|Y
n)−H(M1|X
n) (44)
= I(M1;X
n)− I(M1;Y
n). (45)
By the similar argument as in the sum rate derivation, we can get
nR1 ≥
n∑
i=1
[I(M1, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Xi)− I(M1, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Yi)] (46)
≥ n[I(V ;XJ)− I(V ;YJ)] (47)
= nI(V ;XJ |YJ) (48)
= nI(V ;X |Y ). (49)
where V as defined in (28) and J is uniform on [1 : n], which concludes the converse proof of Theorem 1.
6IV. THE CONVERSE OF THEOREM 2
A. The Extremal Inequality
As in [16], the achievable rate region of (RK , R1, R2) for vector Gaussian sources is defined as
R(X,Y,Z) , {(RK , R1, R2) : (RK , R1, R2) is achievable} . (50)
Due to the convexity of R(X,Y,Z), to characterize the optimal trade-off of (RK , R1, R2) for the vector Gaussian model, we
can write the following µ-sum problem, alternatively,
inf
(RK ,R1,R2)∈R(X,Y,Z)
µ1(R2 −RK) + µ2(R1 +R2) + µ3R1 (51)
= inf
(RK ,R1,R2)∈R(X,Y,Z)
(µ2 + µ3)R1 + (µ1 + µ2)R2 − µ1RK , (52)
for any µ1, µ2, µ3 ≥ 0. To prove the converse part of Theorem 2, it is equivalent to show the following inequality folds for
any (RK , R1, R2) ∈ R(X,Y,Z),
(µ2 + µ3)R1 + (µ1 + µ2)R2 − µ1RK ≥ R
∗(µ1, µ2, µ3), (53)
where R∗(µ1, µ2, µ3) is a Gaussian optimization problem shown as follows
R
∗(µ1, µ2, µ3)
, min
B1,B2
µ1 + µ2
2
log |K+KY −B1 −B2| −
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B1 −B2|
−
µ2
2
log |K−B1 −B2|+
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B1|
+
µ3 − µ1
2
log |K+KY −B1| −
µ3
2
log |K−B1|
+
µ2 + µ3
2
log |K| −
µ2 + µ3
2
log |K+KY |
subject to B1  0, B2  0. (54)
Let (B∗1,B
∗
2) be one (non-unique) minimizer of the optimization problem R
∗(µ1, µ2, µ3). The necessary Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The minimizer (B∗1,B
∗
2) of R
∗(µ1, µ2, µ3) need to satisfy
µ1
2
(K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1
+
µ2
2
(K−B∗1 −B
∗
2)
−1
=
µ1 + µ2
2
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1
+M2, (55)
µ3
2
(K−B∗1)
−1
+
µ1 − µ3
2
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
+M2 =
µ1
2
(K+KZ −B
∗
1)
−1
+M1, (56)
for some positive semi-definite matrices B∗1,B
∗
2,M1,M2  0 such that
B
∗
1M1 =M1B
∗
1 = 0, (57)
B
∗
2M2 =M2B
∗
2 = 0. (58)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Now Starting from the single-letter expressions in Theorem 1, the µ-sum problem for any rate tuple in R(X,Y,Z) should
be lower bounded by
(µ2 + µ3)R1 + (µ1 + µ2)R2 − µ1RK (59)
= µ1(R2 −RK) + µ2(R1 +R2) + µ3R1 (60)
≥ µ1(I(U ;Z|V )− I(U ;Y|V )) + µ2I(U ;X|Y) + µ3I(V ;X|Y) (61)
(a)
= µ1(I(U ;Z|V )− I(U ;Y|V )) + µ2(I(U ;X) − I(U ;Y)) + µ3(I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y)) (62)
(b)
= µ1h(Z|V ) + (µ3 − µ1)h(Y|V )− µ3h(X|V ) + (µ1 + µ2)h(Y|U) − µ2h(X|U)− µ1h(Z|U)
+ (µ2 + µ3)h(X)− (µ2 + µ3)h(Y) (63)
= (µ1 + µ2)h(Y|U) − µ1h(Z|U)− µ2h(X|U) + µ1h(Z|V ) + (µ3 − µ1)h(Y|V )− µ3h(X|V )
+
µ2 + µ3
2
log |K| −
µ2 + µ3
2
log |K+KY |. (64)
where
(a) follows from Makov Chain (U, V )→ X→ Y,
7(b) follows from Makov Chain V → U → X→ (Y,Z).
By comparing (64) with optimization problemR∗(µ1, µ2, µ3) in (54), it can be shown that to prove Theorem 2, it is sufficient
to prove the following extremal inequality
Theorem 3. There exist two positive semi-definite matrices B∗1 and B
∗
2, which satisfy KKT conditions (55)-(58) in lemma 1
to minimize optimization problem R∗(µ1, µ2, µ3), then for some real numbers µ1, µ2, µ3 ≥ 0, we have
(µ1 + µ2)h(Y|U) − µ1h(Z|U)− µ2h(X|U)
+ µ1h(Z|V ) + (µ3 − µ1)h(Y|V )− µ3h(X|V )
≥
µ1 + µ2
2
log |K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2| −
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2|
−
µ2
2
log |K−B∗1 −B
∗
2|+
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1|
+
µ3 − µ1
2
log |K+KY −B
∗
1| −
µ3
2
log |K−B∗1| , (65)
for any (U, V ) such that V → U → X→ (Y,Z) forms a Markov chain.
The proof of (65) depends on the enhancement argument introduced in [23], [24], which can be divided into two steps. In
the first step, we enhance the source Y to Y˜ such that the Markov chain X → Y˜ → (Y,Z) holds. In the second step, we
decouple to extremal inequality (64) to two new ones, associated with enhanced sources Y˜, respectively. The proof of extremal
inequality (64) in provided by involving the two enhanced extremal inequalities, which is related to the degraded compound
MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel in [28], [29], and the vector generalization of Costa’s entropy power inequality in [16],
[26].
B. Some Lemmas
In order to reduce the non-degraded sources to the degraded case, we introduce a new covariance matrix such that
µ1 + µ2
2
(
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2
)−1
=
µ1 + µ2
2
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1
+M2 ≻ 0. (66)
Then K˜Y has useful properties listed in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. K˜Y has the following properties:
1) 0 ≺ K˜Y  KY ;
2) K˜Y  KZ ;
3) µ1+µ22
(
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1
)−1
= µ1+µ22 (K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
+M2;
4)
(
K+ K˜Y −B∗1 −B
∗
2
)−1 (
K+ K˜Y −B∗1
)
= (K+KY −B∗1 −B
∗
2)
−1
(K+KY −B∗1) .
Proof. The proof of Lemma 2 is left in Appendix D.
Moreover, to decouple our extremal inequality (65), we need the vector generalization of Costa’s entropy power inequality
[26], and the generalized extremal inequality related the degraded compound MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel in [28], [29],
as two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 3 ( [26, Corollary 2]). Let Z1, Z2 and Z3 be Gaussian random vectors with positive definite covariance matrices
N1, N2 and N3, respectively. Furthermore, N1, N2 satisfy N1  N2. If there exists a positive semi-definite covariance B∗
such that
(B∗ +N1)
−1
+ λ (B∗ +N2)
−1
= (λ + 1) (B∗ +N3)
−1
, (67)
where λ ≥ 0, then
h(X+ Z1|U) + µh(X+ Z2|U)− (µ+ 1)h(X+ Z3|U)
≤
1
2
log |B∗ +N1|+
µ
2
log |B∗ +N2| −
µ+ 1
2
log |B∗ +N3|, (68)
for any (X, U) independent of (Z1,Z2,Z3).
Lemma 4 ( [28, Corollary 4]). Let {Zi}
L1
i=1 and {Zj}
L2
j=1 be real Gaussian random vectors with positive definite covariance
matrices {Ni}
L1
i=1 and {Nj}
L2
j=1, respectively. We assume that there exits a covariance matrix N
∗ such that
{Ni}
L1
i=1  N
∗  {Nj}
L2
j=1. (69)
8Furthermore, let B∗ be a positive semi-definite covariance matrix such that
L1∑
i=1
λi (B
∗ +Ni)
−1
=
L2∑
j=1
λj (B
∗ +Nj)
−1
+Ψ, (70)
where λi, λj ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ L1, 1 ≤ j ≤ L2, Ψ  0 and
(K−B∗)Ψ = Ψ (K−B∗) = 0. (71)
The for any distribution (X, U) independent of {Zi}
L1
i=1 and {Zj}
L2
j=1 , such that cov (X|U)  K, we have
L1∑
i=1
λih(X+ Zi|U)−
L2∑
j=1
λjh(X+ Zj |U)
≤
L1∑
i=1
λi
2
log |B∗ +Ni| −
L2∑
j=1
λj
2
log |B∗ +Nj |. (72)
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We proceed to proof the extremal inequality (65). At the beginning, we rewrite the l.h.s. of (65) by involving the enhancement
source Y˜.
(µ1 + µ2)h(Y|U)− µ1h(Z|U)− µ2h(X|U)
+ µ1h(Z|V ) + (µ3 − µ1)h(Y|V )− µ3h(X|V )
= (µ1 + µ2)h(Y˜|U)− µ1h(Z|U)− µ2h(X|U) (73a)
+ µ1h(Z|V ) + (µ2 + µ3)h(Y|V )− (µ1 + µ2)h(Y˜|V )− µ3h(X|V ) (73b)
+ (µ1 + µ2)
(
h(Y|U)− h(Y˜|U)
)
− (µ1 + µ2)
(
h(Y|V )− h(Y˜|V )
)
. (73c)
1) The lower bound of (73a): Notice that from the definition of Y in (66), and the KKT conditions of (55), we get
µ1
2
(K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1
+
µ2
2
(K−B∗1 −B
∗
2)
−1
=
µ1 + µ2
2
(
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2
)−1
. (74)
Furthermore, from the first and second statement of Lemma 2,
0 ≺ K˜Y  KZ . (75)
Using which in conjecture with Lemma 3, we have the following lower bound of (73a):
(µ1 + µ2)h(Y˜|U)− µ1h(Z|U)− µ2h(X|U)
≥
µ1 + µ2
2
log
∣∣∣K+ K˜Y −B∗1 −B∗2
∣∣∣− µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2|
−
µ2
2
log |K−B∗1 −B
∗
2| . (76)
2) The lower bound of (73b): Notice that from the third statement of Lemma 2, and the KKT conditions of (56), we get
µ3
2
(K−B∗1)
−1
+
µ1 + µ2
2
(
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1
)−1
=
µ2 + µ3
2
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
+
µ1
2
(K+KZ −B
∗
1)
−1
+M1, (77)
Furthermore, from the first and second statement of Lemma 2,
0 ≺ K˜Y  {KY ,KZ} . (78)
Notice the KKT conditions of (57) as well. We can use Lemma 4 to obtain the following lower bound on (73b):
µ1h(Z|V ) + (µ2 + µ3)h(Y|V )− (µ1 + µ2)h(Y˜|V )− µ3h(X|V )
≥
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1|+
µ2 + µ3
2
log |K+KY −B
∗
1|
−
µ1 + µ2
2
log
∣∣∣K+ K˜Y −B∗1
∣∣∣− µ3
2
log |K−B∗1| . (79)
93) The lower bound of (73c): From the first statement of Lemma 2, we can decompose Y into two parts: Y = Y˜ + Yˆ,
where Yˆ is a Gaussian random vector with covariance KY − K˜Y , and it is assumed to be independent of (Y˜, U). The
difference between h(Y|U) and h(Y˜|U) may be written as
h(Y|U)− h(Y˜|U)
= h(Y˜ + Yˆ|U)− h(Y˜|U) (80)
(a)
= h(Yˆ)− h(Y˜|Y˜ + Yˆ, U) (81)
(b)
≥ h(Yˆ)− h(Y˜|Y˜ + Yˆ, V ) (82)
= h(Y|V )− h(Y˜|V ). (83)
where
(a) follows from h(Y˜, Y˜ + Yˆ|U) = h(Y˜|U) + h(Yˆ) = h(Y˜ + Yˆ|U) + h(Y˜|Y˜ + Yˆ, U).
(b) follows from Markov chain V → U → X→ Y˜, and the fact that conditioning reduces entropy.
Thus, (83) implies (73c) is lower bounded by 0.
Now we are ready to show the extremal inequality (65) via combining all the lower bounds together.
(µ1 + µ2)h(Y|U)− µ1h(Z|U)− µ2h(X|U)
+ µ1h(Z|V ) + (µ3 − µ1)h(Y|V )− µ3h(X|V )
≥
µ1 + µ2
2
log
∣∣∣K+ K˜Y −B∗1 −B∗2
∣∣∣ − µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2|
−
µ2
2
log |K−B∗1 −B
∗
2|+
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1|+
µ2 + µ3
2
log |K+KY −B
∗
1|
−
µ1 + µ2
2
log
∣∣∣K+ K˜Y −B∗1
∣∣∣− µ3
2
log |K−B∗1| (84)
=
µ1 + µ2
2
log
∣∣∣K+ K˜Y −B∗1 −B∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣K+ K˜Y −B∗1
∣∣∣ −
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2|
−
µ2
2
log |K−B∗1 −B
∗
2|+
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1|+
µ2 + µ3
2
log |K+KY −B
∗
1|
−
µ3
2
log |K−B∗1| (85)
(a)
=
µ1 + µ2
2
log
|K+KY −B∗1 −B
∗
2|
|K+KY −B∗1|
−
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2|
−
µ2
2
log |K−B∗1 −B
∗
2|+
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1|+
µ2 + µ3
2
log |K+KY −B
∗
1|
−
µ3
2
log |K−B∗1| (86)
=
µ1 + µ2
2
log |K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2| −
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2|
−
µ2
2
log |K−B∗1 −B
∗
2|+
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B
∗
1|
+
µ3 − µ1
2
log |K+KY −B
∗
1| −
µ3
2
log |K−B∗1| , (87)
where (a) follows from the forth statement of Lemma 2.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the vector Gaussian secret key generation problem with limited rate constrained public and private
communications. A single-letter characterization is obtained. The proof is based on suitable applications of the enhancement
argument, and the proof of a new extremal inequality, which should be decoupled into two different forms of extremal
inequalities. One future direction of our work is the Vector Gaussian secure source problem in [27]. Since the covariance
matrices constraints make that the enhancement argument fails to establish the degraded order of sources, the single-letter
characterization of that problem is still open. A new extremal inequality construction method should be investigated in a
future.
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APPENDIX A
THE ACHIEVABILITY OF GAUSSIAN CODEBOOKS IN THEOREM 2
The achievability part is to show the rate region of (5)-(7) can be parameterized by two positive semi-definite matrices
B1,B2  0. The ingredient here is that the Markov chain V → U → X → (Y,Z) can be transferred into certain partial
order relations on Gaussian covariance matrices. Moreover, we can find particular a point parameterized by (B1,B2) in the
rate region of (5)-(7).
By restricting to the Gaussian distributed codewords, the jointly random vectors (U, V,X) can be expressed in the following
form
V = X+NV , (88)
U = X+NU , (89)
where NV ,NU are zero mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices ΣV ,ΣU . Notice the NV ,NU is independent
of X,Y,Z, but can be correlated to each other. For the sake of simplifying notations in the rest derivations, we write
KX|V =
(
K
−1 +N−1V
)−1
, (90)
KX|U =
(
K
−1 +N−1U
)−1
. (91)
Equations (5)-(7) in Theorem 1 can be shown as
RK −R2 ≤ I(U ;Y|V )− I(U ;Z|V ) (92)
(a)
= h(Y|V )− h(Z|V )− h(Y|U) + h(Z|U) (93)
=
1
2
log
|KX|V +KY |
|KX|V +KZ |
−
1
2
log
|KX|U +KY |
|KX|U +KZ |
(94)
, I1
(
KX|V,KX|U
)
, (95)
where (a) follows from Makov Chain V → U → X→ (Y,Z).
R1 +R2 ≥ I(U ;X|Y) (96)
(a)
= h(X|U)− h(Y|U) (97)
=
1
2
log
|KX|U |
|KX|U +KY |
(98)
, I2
(
KX|U
)
, (99)
where (a) follows from Makov Chain U → X→ Y.
R1 ≥ I(V ;X|Y) (100)
(a)
= h(X|V )− h(Y|V ) (101)
=
1
2
log
|KX|V |
|KX|V +KY |
(102)
, I3
(
KX|V
)
, (103)
where (a) follows from Makov Chain V → X → Y. Moreover, because of the Markov chain V → U → X, we have the
following partial order on the positive definite matrices KX|V ,KX|U ,
K  KX|V  KX|U ≻ 0. (104)
Now consider the optimization problem
max I1
(
KX|V,KX|U
)
subject to I2
(
KX|U
)
≤ R1 +R2,
I3
(
KX|V
)
≤ R1,
K  KX|V  KX|U ≻ 0. (105)
Let (K∗
X|V ,K
∗
X|U ) be an optimal solution of this problem. Since I2(·), I3(·) should be less than some nonnegative values, it
indicate that there exist a positive definite matrix L ≻ 0 such that K∗
X|V ,K
∗
X|U  L. From this view of point, the constraint
KX|U ≻ 0 can be removed safely, without affecting the optimal values of maximization problem (105).
11
Furthermore, (K∗
X|V ,K
∗
X|U ) can be denoted by
K
∗
X|V = K−B1, (106)
K
∗
X|U = K−B1 −B2, (107)
and substitute (106) and (107) into I1(·), I2(·) and I3(·). Inequalities (11)-(13) in Theorem 2 are obtained equivalently for
some positive semi-definite matrices B1, B2  0.
APPENDIX B
THE ACHIEVABILITY OF THEOREM 1
Consider a given distribution
p(v, u, x, y, z) = p(v, u)p(x|u)p(y, z|x). (108)
Case 1: If R1 ≥ I(U ;X |Y )
We use a separate scheme as follows. Alice use the public channel to achieve a secrecy rate I(U ;Y |V )− I(U ;Z|V ) by the
scheme in secret key generation, and use the secure channel to distribute another secret key with rate R2. Combine two secret
keys together, the secrecy rate in (5) is achievable.
Case 2: If R1 ≤ I(U ;X |Y ).
In this case, we assume that I(V ;Y ) ≤ I(V ;Z). The reason is that if I(V ;Y ) > I(V ;Z), we define a pair of new random
variable (U ′, V ′) such that U ′ = (U, V ) and V ′ = ∅. Then we have I(V ′;Y ) ≤ I(V ′;Z). From the three inequalities in the
main theorem, we have
RK ≤ I(U ;Y |V )− I(U ;Z|V ) +R2 (109)
≤ I(U ′;Y |V ′)− I(U ′;Z|V ′) +R2 (110)
R1 +R2 ≥ I(U ;X |Y ) = I(U
′;X |Y ) (111)
R1 ≥ I(V ;X |Y ) ≥ I(V
′;X |Y ) (112)
The above derivation shows that for every pair (U, V ) with Markov chain V ′ → U ′ → X and I(V ;Y ) > I(V ;Z), we can
find another pair (U ′, V ′) with Markov chain V → U → X and I(V ′;Y ) ≤ I(V ′;Z) such that the rate region with (U ′, V ′)
is achievable implies that the rate region with (U, T ) is also achievable. Therefore, we only need to consider the case where
I(V ;Y ) ≤ I(V ;Z).
We define the following notations
R11 = I(V ;X |Y ) (113)
R12 = R1 −R11 (114)
R21 = I(U ;X |Y, V )−R12 (115)
R22 = R2 −R21 (116)
RV = I(V ;X) (117)
RU = I(U ;X |V ) (118)
RK1 = I(U ;Y |V )− I(U ;Z|V ) (119)
Codebook generation:
1) Randomly and independently generation 2nRV sequences vn(s1), s1 ∈ [1 : 2nRv ] according to distribution p(v) and
randomly and independently partition them into 2nR11 bins with bin indices B1(m11), m11 ∈ [1 : 2nR11 ].
2) For each codeword vn(s1), randomly and independently generation 2
nRU sequences un(s1, s2), s2 ∈ [1 : 2nRU ] according
to p(u|v), and randomly and independently partition them into 2n(R12+R21) bins with bin indices B2(s1,m12,m21),
m12 ∈ [1 : 2
nR12 ] and m21 ∈ [1 : 2
nR21 ]. Randomly and independently partition the sequences in each nonempty bin
B2(s1,m12,m21) into 2nRK1 bins with bin indices B2(s1,m12,m21, k1), k1 ∈ [1 : 2nRK1 ].
Encoding:
1) Given a source sequence Xn, find the index s1 such that (v
n(s1), X
n) is jointly typical with respect to the joint
distribution p(v, x), i.e., (vn(s1), X
n) ∈ T n[VX]δ . If there is no such index or there are more than one such indices,
then randomly select s1 from [1 : 2
nRV ], where the probability of such event is arbitrarily small if RV > I(V ;X). Let
B1(m11) be the bin index of vn(s1).
2) Then find the index s2 such that (v
n(s1), u
n(s1, s2), X
n) ∈ T n[V UX]δ . If there is no such index or there are more than
one such indices, then random select s2 from [1 : 2
nRU ], where the probability of such event is arbitrarily small if
RU > I(U ;X |V ). Let B2(s1,m12,m21, k1) be the bin index of un(s1, s2).
3) Randomly choose k2 ∈ [1; 2nR22].
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4) Alice sends M1 = (m11,m12) and M2 = (m21, k2) to Bob through the public and secure channel, respectively.
5) Alice chooses K = (k1, k2,m21) as the secret key.
Decoding: Upon receiving (M1,M2), Bob decodes the secret key as following:
1) Find the unique sequence vn(sˆ1) ∈ B1(m11) such that (vn(sˆ1), yn) ∈ T n[V Y ]δ . And the probability that there is no such
sequence or there are more than one such sequences is arbitrarily small if
RV −R11 < I(V ;Y ) (120)
2) Find the index sˆ2 ∈ B2(sˆ1,m12,m21) such that (vn(sˆ1), un(sˆ1, sˆ2), yn) ∈ T n[V UY ]δ . Let B2(sˆ1,m12,m21, kˆ1) be the
bin index of un(sˆ1, sˆ2). The probability that there is no such sequence or there are more than one such sequences is
arbitrarily small if
RU −R12 −R21 < I(U ;Y |V ) (121)
3) Let Kˆ = (kˆ1, k2,m21)
Key leakage rate: We consider the key leakage rate averaged over the random coding scheme as described above. We begin
with
H(K|Zn,M1)
= H(K,Un, V n|Zn,M1)−H(U
n, V n|Zn,K,M1) (122)
= H(Un, V n|Zn,M1) +H(K|U
n, V n, Zn,M1)−H(U
n, V n|Zn,K,M1) (123)
(a)
= H(V n|Zn,M1) +H(U
n|Zn,M1, V
n) +H(K2)−H(V
n|K,Zn,M1)−H(U
n|K,Zn,M1, V
n) (124)
= I(V n;K|Zn,M1) +H(U
n|Zn, V n) +H(K2)− I(U
n;M1|Z
n, V n)−H(Un|K,Zn,M1, V
n) (125)
≥ H(Un|Zn, V n) +H(K2) +H(M1|Z
n, V n, Un)−H(M1|Z
n)−H(Un|K,Zn,M1, V
n) (126)
(b)
≥ H(Un|Zn, V n) +H(K2)−H(M1)−H(U
n|K,Zn,M1, V
n) (127)
(c)
≥ H(Un|Zn, V n) + nR22 − nR1 −H(U
n|K1,M21, Z
n,M1, V
n) (128)
where
(a) follows because K = (K1,K2,M21), in which K2 is independent of (U
n, V n, Zn,M1) and K1 and M21 are functions
of Un;
(b) follows because M1 = (M11,M12) is a function of (V
n, Un);
(c) follows because K2 is uniformly distributed, H(M1) is upper bounded by nR1, and K = (K1,M21).
For the first term in (128), we have
1
n
H(Un|Zn, V n)
=
1
n
[H(Un|V n)− I(Zn;Un|V n)] (129)
≤ RU − I(Z;U |V ) (130)
For the fourth term, similar to [31, Lemma 22.3], we can bound it in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. If RK1 < H(U |Z, V )−H(U |Y, V )− 2δ(ǫ)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(Un|K1,M21, Z
n,M1, V
n) ≤ RU −RK1 −R21 −R1 − I(Z;U |V ) + δ(ǫ) (131)
From the above derivation, we have
1
n
I(K;Zn,M1)
=
1
n
[H(K)−H(K|Zn,M1)] (132)
≤
1
n
H(K)− [RK1 +R21 +R22 − δ(ǫ)] (133)
≤ δ(ǫ) (134)
which concludes the proof of the achievability of Theorem 1.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since the program of R∗(µ1, µ2, µ3) in (54) is not necessarily convex, the KKT conditions are necessary but not sufficient.
We first give the Lagrangian of (54) as follows
L =
µ1 + µ2
2
log |K+KY −B1 −B2| −
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B1 −B2|
−
µ2
2
log |K−B1 −B2|+
µ1
2
log |K+KZ −B1|
+
µ3 − µ1
2
log |K+KY −B1| −
µ3
2
log |K−B1|
+
µ2 + µ3
2
log |K| −
µ2 + µ3
2
log |K+KY |
− tr {B1M1 +B2M2} , (135)
where M1 and M2 are Lagrange multipliers. Let (B
∗
1,B
∗
2) be one optimal solution of R
∗(µ1, µ2, µ3). The necessary KKT
conditions that it need to satisfy are given by
∇B1L =
µ1 + µ2
2
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1 −
µ1
2
(K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1 −
µ2
2
(K−B∗1 −B
∗
2)
−1
+
µ1
2
(K+KZ −B
∗
1)
−1
+
µ3 − µ1
2
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1 −
µ3
2
(K−B∗1)
−1
+M1 = 0, (136)
∇B2L =
µ1 + µ2
2
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1 −
µ1
2
(K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1 −
µ2
2
(K−B∗1 −B
∗
2)
−1
+M2 = 0, (137)
tr {B∗1M1} =0, (138)
tr {B∗2M2} =0, (139)
B
∗
1,B
∗
2,M1,M2 0. (140)
Notice that (136) is equivalent to (55). Substituting (137) from (136) yields (56).Since tr {AB} = tr {BA} ≥ 0, forA,B  0,
(138)-(139) yields (57)-(58).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
1) From the definition of K˜Y in (66),
µ1 + µ2
2
(
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2
)−1
=
µ1 + µ2
2
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1
+M2 (141)

µ1 + µ2
2
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1
. (142)
The last inequality is due to M2  0. Thus we have
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2  K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2. (143)
This yields
K˜Y  KY . (144)
Sine KZ ≻ 0, by substituting (66) into KKT conditions of (55), we get
µ1 + µ2
2
(
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2
)−1
=
µ1
2
(K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1
+
µ2
2
(K−B∗1 −B
∗
2)
−1
(145)
≺
µ1 + µ2
2
(K−B∗1 −B
∗
2)
−1
. (146)
Thus we have
K−B∗1 −B
∗
2 ≺ K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2. (147)
This yields
K˜Y ≻ 0. (148)
2) From (145), we have
µ1 + µ2
2
(
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2
)−1

µ1 + µ2
2
(K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1
. (149)
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Thus we have
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2  K+KZ −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2. (150)
This yields
K˜Y  KZ . (151)
3) The proof of Statement 3) is shown as follows:
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1
(a)
=
(
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1 +
1
µ1 + µ2
M2
)−1
+B∗2 (152)
=
(
I+
1
µ1 + µ2
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)M2
)−1
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2) +B
∗
2 (153)
(b)
=
(
I+
1
µ1 + µ2
(K+KY −B
∗
1)M2
)−1
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2) +B
∗
2 (154)
=
(
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
+
1
µ1 + µ2
M2
)−1
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2) +B
∗
2 (155)
=
(
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
+
1
µ1 + µ2
M2
)−1
−
(
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
+
1
µ1 + µ2
M2
)−1
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
B
∗
2 +B
∗
2 (156)
(c)
=
(
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
+
1
µ1 + µ2
M2
)−1
−
(
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
+
1
µ1 + µ2
M2
)−1(
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
+
1
µ1 + µ2
M2
)
B
∗
2 +B
∗
2 (157)
=
(
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
+
1
µ1 + µ2
M2
)−1
−B∗2 +B
∗
2 (158)
=
(
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
−1
+
1
µ1 + µ2
M2
)−1
, (159)
where
(a) comes from the definition in (66);
(b) is due to KKT condition (58): B∗2M2 =M2B
∗
2 = 0;
(c) is also due to KKT condition (58).
4) The proof of Statement 4) is shown as follows:
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1
(K+KY −B
∗
1)
=I+ (K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1
B
∗
2 (160)
(a)
= I+
(
(K+KY −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2)
−1
+
1
µ+ 1
M2
)
B
∗
2 (161)
(b)
=I+
(
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2
)−1
B
∗
2 (162)
=
(
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1 −B
∗
2
)−1 (
K+ K˜Y −B
∗
1
)
, (163)
where
(a) is due to KKT condition (58): B∗2M2 =M2B
∗
2 = 0;
(b) comes from the definition in (66).
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